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University of Pittsburgh, 2020 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Healthcare systems are moving towards a higher level of provider accountability for the 
quality and outcomes of care. In achieving this mission, The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
has implemented various value-based purchasing models including: The Physician Quality 
Reporting System, Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Model, and The Merit Based Incentive 
Payment System (MIPS). MIPS is one of the largest programs and is built off of the value-based 
payment models that exists in nearly all Medicare settings. The system was created to analyze 
clinical quality measures, but the concern centers around it failing to address social risk factors 
such as income, race, and other social determinants of health.  
Providers that disproportionately serve vulnerable populations such as dual eligible 
patients, are at a great risk of being financially penalized under MIPS. The dual eligible population, 
those who qualify for both Medicare and Medicaid, have many barriers such as lack of 
transportation and disabilities that prevent them from accessing care. These factors, known as the 
social determinants of health, are unmeasured in Medicare claims data but are associated with 
health outcomes and impact providers performance. Since MIPS fails to address these public 
health factors, providers who serve a disproportionate share of medically and socially complex 
patients are more likely to receive a financial penalty compared to their peers who do not serve 
 v 
this population. In order to align payments and ensure value-based purchasing programs achieve 
their intended goals, the relationship between social risks and performance metrics needs to be 
better understood and aligned. 
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1.0 Background 
The United States healthcare system is unlike any other in the world. The U.S. does not 
have a uniform health insurance system and as a result health insurance is not guaranteed for all 
citizens. Along with these factors, the U.S. spends about $3.5 trillion on health expenditures 
making up 18% of GDP(CMS,2017). This is more than twice the average spent among other 
developed countries. Despite these expenditures on health care, compared to other industrialized 
countries, Americans still have lower life expectancy, higher rates of infant mortality, and a 
greater burden of debilitating chronic diseases. It is known that 80% of health outcomes are 
attributable to social, environmental, and behavioral factors, while only 20% are attributable to 
medical care (Bradley,2013). Although these statistics hold true, providers are increasingly held 
accountable for consequences of social risk factors that present in the healthcare system, despite 
a small investment outside the system to address these social determinants of health.  
As mentioned, the U.S. spends a disproportionate amount on health care spending 
compared to social services spending. In comparison to the $3.5 trillion that the U.S spends on 
health care; social services only receive $357 billion in funding (Historical data,2019). The 
social service funding is used towards various forms of in-kind assistance for lower income 
individuals such as food stamps, school meals, low-income housing, and assistance in meeting 
home energy bills. Although a direct causation cannot be inferred, countries with a more 
equivalent allocation of spending between social services and health care tend to have healthier 
populations. The figures below portray the concept behind this thought.    
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Figure 1. Health and Social Care Spending as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Figure 2. Select Population Health Outcomes and Risk Factors 
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Exhibit eight compares health and social care spending as a percentage of a country’s 
GDP. Based on data, the U.S. spends about 16% on health care and only 9% on social care. In 
comparison both France and Sweden spend 21% on social care and only 12% on health care. In 
looking at exhibit nine, France has a life expectancy of about 82 years and an infant mortality 
rate of 3.6. In contrast, the U.S. has a life expectancy of 79 years and an infant mortality rate of 
6.1. This reinforces the statement that higher health care spending is not equivalent to a healthier 
population.  
As seen in these exhibits, relative to the U. S.’s OECD counterparts, the U.S. spends 
comparatively less on social services, but disproportionately more on health care. The neglect of 
social service financing in the U.S. has caused an increase in unaddressed factors that impact 
health including poor housing, food insecurity, financial instability, and lack of transportation.  
When these social risk factors go unaddressed it exacerbates health risks especially for 
the lower income population and may lead to sustained cycles of poor socioeconomic status and 
health. For example, individuals living in poverty are at an increased risk for developing poor 
health outcomes. Lack of education leads to a lower income, which leads to limited options on 
where an individual can live and their food choices. Poor quality housing can cause asthma 
among children and a poor diet can lead to multiple comorbidities such as high blood pressure 
and diabetes. When and if these patients access care, it is often at a later stage in the disease’s 
progression making it more costly and difficult for providers to treat the patient. If these 
underlying social risk factors are not taken into consideration when evaluating providers 
performance, those providers serving more disadvantaged patients will be penalized under value-
based purchasing programs. In addition, the resources to address the high needs and costs of their 
patients will be taken away due to the systems penalization methods.  
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2.0 Policy History on Alternative Payment Models 
In 2010, President Obama recognized the need for change within healthcare, specifically 
the insurance sector. Under the Obama administration, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), which marked the beginning of a significant perspective shift towards value-based 
purchasing programs (VBP). During this time, CMS was a major catalyst behind creating and 
implementing alternative payment models (APM’s) that could incentivize change for providers. 
Prior to APM’s, most health services were financed under a fee for service model. Under this 
structure, a physician was paid a fee for each particular service provided. The model rewarded 
physicians for volume and quantity of services provided regardless of the patient’s outcome. 
Under the ACA, rather than focusing on the volume of care, providers were challenged to 
address the quality and value of their care, which became known as VBP. Although fee for 
service models still exists today, in some APM’s such as MIPS, there is a mix of a fee for service 
component and a VBP component (Medicare Access,2016). Although these two components 
exist, more of an emphasis is placed on the VBP component in attempt to control costs and 
improve patients’ health outcomes.  
In April of 2015, President Obama further signed into law the Medicare Access and 
CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA). The act changed the way Medicare rewarded providers. It 
initiated rewards for the value of care over volume of care. The act streamlined multiple quality 
improvement programs under MIPS and provided bonus payments to providers for participation 
in alternative payment models (Medicare Access, 2016). This system tied an increased 
percentage of participating physicians Medicare fee for service payments to outcomes through 
 5 
MIPS. This model measures providers based on certain clinical outcomes, which either penalizes 
or rewards them for their clinical practice.  
MIPS operates by combining previous VBP programs into a single program. Parts of the 
Physicians Quality Reporting System, the Value Modifier, and the Medicare Electronic Health 
Record (EHR) incentive program can be seen in MIPS. Physicians engaged in MIPS are 
measured on four metrics; quality, promoting interoperability, improvement activities, and costs 
(Background: MACRA and MIPS,2016). Performance on these categories are weighted and put 
into an overall score. The score translates to an upward, downward, or neutral payment 
adjustment that providers will receive two years after the performance period. For example, 2016 
performances will impact provider’s Medicare payments in 2018. Once this program is fully 
phased in, it will be the largest mandatory pay for performance program for physicians. 
2.1 Quality Measures used in MIPS 
Providers who participated in MIPS are assessed against four measures. In 2019, quality 
measures accounted for 50% of a provider’s final score. When a provider submits measures for 
MIPS, each measure is assessed against a benchmark provided by CMS to determine how many 
points the measure can earn. Additionally, providers can earn bonus points in the quality 
category through reporting additional high priority measures, end to end measure reporting, year 
over year category improvement, and small practice bonus (Quality Measures,2019). Examples 
of measures include 30-day all cause hospital readmission, asthma control, and hemoglobin A1c 
levels. 
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In every type of care setting examined, providers that disproportionately served 
beneficiaries with greater social risk factors tended to have worse performance on the quality 
measure portion. In essence, the system is taking money away from providers who serve the poor 
and giving it directly to providers who serve the wealthy (Frakt,2017). Providers who serve a 
wealthier subset of the population will have better quality measures because their patients do not 
experience the same social barriers as lower income patients. Wealthier patients have the 
necessary resources to take care of their health, while lower income patients experience barriers 
in achieving positive health outcomes. As a result, medical practices could select patients who 
are more likely to stay healthy and have better outcomes making it appear that their physicians 
provide higher quality care. Since the quality measure accounts for the highest percentage of 
points, it is concern for most providers who serve lower income patients. 
In addition to the quality measures, providers report on promoting interoperability (30% 
final score), improvement activities (20%), and cost measures (0%). In order for providers to 
achieve a bonus they are held accountable for a variety of measures that address many angles of 
patient care. Further supporting the concept that disadvantaged practices will perform poorly 
under MIPs, researchers found that nearly 30% of the medical practices eligible to participate in 
MIPS the first year were penalized because they failed to report any data. Many of these 
practices were likely to be smaller and lack functional electronic health records suggesting that 
Medicare could focus on technical assistance efforts and electronic infrastructure support on such 
practices. Since meaningful use of EHR’s is included in the final MIPS score, providers who 
work in practices with limited electronic upgrades will lose points in this category. These 
practices are often in disadvantaged areas which when combined with a complex patient mix 
further decreases providers overall score.  
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2.2 Conclusion on MIPS 
In 2019, MIPS expanded to include physical therapists, occupational therapists, qualified 
speech language pathologists, audiologists, clinical psychologists, and registered dieticians 
(CMS). This VBP model, continues to expand into non-traditional clinician’s work. As this 
model and others similar to it, continue to gain interest it is important to surface issues related to 
the quality of care provided, especially focusing on vulnerable populations.  
 Prior to MIPS, the Medicare Value Based Payment Modifier Program was the largest 
mandatory pay for performance program for physicians. In an analysis of the programs first year, 
practices that served higher medically and socially risk patients had lower quality and higher 
costs. In contrast, practices with high social risk only had lower quality and lower costs 
(Chen,2017). However, the largest driver of penalties in this program was failure to register and 
report measures. This may have reflected practices lack of infrastructure or technology which 
makes reporting difficult, especially among higher risk practices that lack access to electronic 
health records.  
Even in this program, the implications of VBP programs on providers serving higher risk 
patients was known. Despite the continued growth of pay for performance programs, there is an 
increasing concern that these programs hold providers accountable for their patient’s risk factors 
that are outside of their control without providing the resources required to address the root 
causes of these social risk factors. This exacerbates health disparities among marginalized 
populations and makes it more difficult for physicians to provide better quality of care for 
complex patient populations.  
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3.0 MIPS impact on providers serving dual eligible beneficiaries 
Under MIPS, providers who see a higher subset of dually eligible beneficiaries are at an 
increased risk for penalization (Chen,2017). In October 2014, Congress passed the Improving 
Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act, which required a closer review of social risk 
factors with performance under existing payment systems. Two important findings suggested 
that Medicare beneficiaries with social risk factors had worse outcomes on many quality 
measures regardless of the providers they saw, and dual enrollment status in both Medicare and 
Medicaid was the most powerful predictor of these poor outcomes.  
All patients who qualify as dually eligible are low income and have few resources. 
Providers who serve this population are tasked with managing the care of not only an older 
population, but also an economically disadvantaged one. These beneficiaries have poorer 
outcomes on cancer screenings, diabetes control, infection rates, and higher spending per 
hospital admission episode (Report to Congress,2017). Providers disproportionately serving dual 
eligible patients were more likely to face financial penalties in most VBP programs. Several 
studies have shown that larger hospitals, teaching hospitals, and safety net hospitals which 
traditionally serve more disadvantaged patients are more likely to rank poorly on quality 
measures (National Academies,2016).  
One study analyzed the effects of Medicare’s first year’s pay for performance program. 
Researchers discovered physician practices that served a disproportionate share of medical and 
socially high-risk patients were more likely to receive a penalty compared with other practices 
(Chen and Epstein, 2017). Patients treated at practices categorized as high social risk face 
challenges such as transportation, food, housing, and security, which are unmeasured in 
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Medicare claims but are associated with health outcomes. Fewer resources also make it more 
difficult for practices who serve these patients to attract qualified clinicians. Practices 
categorized as high social risk may only treat both high and low risk patients in a less expensive 
style because they have significant unmet health care needs (Chen,2017). Findings suggest that if 
current performance patterns persist, practices that serve higher proportion of social or medically 
complex patients may fare poorly under MIPS. 
In addition, an analysis provided by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
discovered that not only were hospitals serving the lowest income patients more likely to be 
penalized under VBP programs, but their average penalty was also double that of those hospitals 
serving the fewest low income patients (Accounting for Social Risk Factors, 2016). Studies also 
examined neighborhoods and found that neighborhood resources such as living in poverty and 
low educational achievement were associated with worse hospital performance on health care 
process measures for VBP programs (Jha,2011). In comparison, provider organizations located 
in neighborhoods with higher socioeconomic status were more likely to have above average 
performance rankings. Based on these finding, this is concerning evidence, as safety net hospitals 
are a vital component in the healthcare industry in providing care to more vulnerable 
communities.  
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Figure 3. Cost and Quality 
 
 
Figure 3, provides visualizations of hospitals performance on quality and cost based on 
the percentage of patients based on insurance status. As seen, hospitals with the highest 
percentage of lower income patients also had the highest cost and lowest quality for managing 
their care.  
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Figure 4. Demographics of Dual Eligibles 
 
Figure 4 further reinforces the fact that dual eligible beneficiaries are in lower 
socioeconomic status, have fewer social supports, and are in poorer health than non-dual eligible 
beneficiaries.  
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4.0 Risk Adjustment 
Prior to the ACA, insurers could deny coverage to higher risk individuals and write 
exclusions into policies or impose unaffordable premiums for individuals with pre-existing 
medical conditions(aapc). As a result, this left the highest risk patients unable to access insurance 
or healthcare. In order to combat this issue, President Obama introduced risk adjustment as one 
of the main components of the ACA. Risk adjustment minimizes costs to insurers for individuals 
who present as a higher risk to the insurer. For example, an insurer who enrolls a greater number 
of higher risk beneficiaries with greater medical complexities will receive additional 
compensation to make up for the extra costs associated with those members. As a result of risk 
adjustment, insurers reimbursement rates should reflect a more accurate payment for the costs of 
treating their higher risk member population. However, because the characteristics of risk 
adjustment are based off of demographic data, a holistic picture of an individual’s health risks 
are not fully captured.  
Risk adjustment models generally use individual’s demographic data such as age, sex, 
and diagnoses to determine a risk score. CMS uses a hierarchical condition category (HCC) to 
calculate risk scores, which predicts spending from diagnoses grouped into categories that 
encompass conditions with similar cost patterns. Medicare’s HCC relies on ICD-10 coding to 
assign risk scores to patients. This model ranks diagnoses into categories that represent 
conditions with similar cost patterns. Longer term conditions such as diabetes and COPD will be 
risk adjusted, while acute illnesses and injuries will not. Shorter term illnesses are not predictive 
of ongoing healthcare costs, so they are not accounted for in the risk adjustment system. For 
example, a patient with multiple chronic conditions is expected to have a higher health care 
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utilization record and higher costs. That individual would have a higher risk adjusted score, so 
the insurer is paid a price that reflects the patient’s complexity. HCC’s help to predict health care 
resource utilization and costs to the health care entity. 
Risk adjustment can benefit both providers and patients. For patients it helps improve the 
opportunity they have for identified care management programs. For providers, since payments 
are closely tied to patient’s health outcomes, it reflects a more accurate quality of care provided. 
However, in certain populations such as providers who serve a higher proportion of dual eligible 
patients, risk adjustment does not consider all of the necessary factors equitably.  
4.1 Accounting for Social Risks 
Currently, Medicare’s HCC model is not taking into account socioeconomic concerns 
such as food insecurity or neighborhood disadvantage. The HCC model, like most other risk 
adjustment models, encompass, few if any social risk factors. If social risk factors were more 
accurately accounted for, providers serving complex patients might receive a more equitable 
reimbursement than they are currently given. Therefore, accounting for case mix of patient’s 
socioeconomic status and medical complexities might minimize the impact pay for performance 
has on healthcare disparities. 
Potential issues that remain unsolved in Medicare risk adjustment include a limited 
perception on claims data. Claims data is generated for billing purposes as a result of patient’s 
encounters with the health care system. These files may contain helpful information on 
demographic, diagnoses, delivered services, and prescriptions. However, since claims data is 
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used for billing purposes, it often cannot holistically capture patient’s social risk factors. It paints 
a minimal picture for patient’s risk factors contributing to health outcomes.  
Accounting for social risk factors is a commitment to achieving health equity within the 
healthcare field. It requires a collaboration of providers, health systems, and payers coming 
together to achieve a universally high standard of health care quality for all patients. When 
value-based purchasing appropriately recognizes the challenges of caring for patients with social 
risk factors combined with creating incentives that lead to improved care, then health equity can 
be achieved.  
In order to determine if a social risk factor should be accounted for in VBP programs, 
three considerations can be made. First, is the social risk factor related to the outcome? Meaning 
is there empirical evidence and a valid reason that there is a relationship between the two 
variables. Establishing a conceptual relationship to meet this criterion can be challenging as 
many social risk factors operate through multiple pathways. However, in reviewing the literature 
researchers have used the fundamental cause theory to establish a relationship between race and 
health outcomes. This has established a conceptual relationship between these two factors, so it 
would be appropriate to recognize them in VBP programs. 
Second, does the social risk factor precede care delivery and is it not a consequence of 
the quality of care? To achieve goals of VBP programs, it is critical to consider whether risk 
factors are the consequences of provider efforts. If a factor can be influenced by the provider, 
then accounting for it may diminish incentives to improve that risk factor. For example, if health 
literacy improves health care outcomes and can be improved by providers, then using the level of 
health literacy in risk adjustment would deter incentives to do that (Accounting for Social Risk 
factors, 2016). Also, the timing of a risk factor must be carefully considered. In thinking about 
 15 
risk factor timing, it may be useful to prioritize slowly changing factors over rapidly changing 
ones. For example, marital status and living alone are indicators of social support. Both can 
change rapidly especially in older individuals.  
Lastly, social risk factors cannot be manipulated by the provider. This aides in protecting 
social risk factors that might create incentives for providers to engage in unproductive behavior 
or deliver suboptimal care for the purpose of a higher payment. This has been seen in terms of 
coding patient diagnoses more completely in order to ensure higher payments to providers 
(Accounting for Social Risk factors, 2016). Modifying the measurement of social risk factors 
may be less likely if measures are externally collected and reported. It may be more likely if 
measures used were based on providers reporting. For example, if hospitals reported patients 
who were referred to receive meal delivery as a measure of food insecurity and financial stress, 
hospital might increase referrals even to patients who do not need that type of support. Ways to 
combat this include, continually monitoring measures to identify if there is any large change 
from the normal threshold and prioritizing specific coding over vague coding. For example, 
enrollment in a specific nutritional assistance program that is valid over a subjective measure of 
food insecurity. These are all recommendations that should be considered when deciding which 
social risk factors are appropriate to incorporate into alternative payment systems.  
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Figure 5. Social Risk Factors 
 
The above framework illustrates which factors could potentially be included in a VBP 
system. The bold lettering signifies indicators that could be accounted for in a Medicare VBP 
programs in the short term. The italicized letters signify longer term inclusion in Medicare’s 
VBP programs. 
4.2 Considerations Adjusting for Social Risk Factors 
As mentioned in order to account for some disparities among patients, certain risk factors 
are adjusted for such as age and clinical co-morbidities. Most measures used within the Medicare 
VBP programs are used to profile providers against one another to show the quality of care 
provided or accountability they have towards patients (Hierarchical Conditions Category, 2019). 
 17 
Risk adjustment should fairly compare providers to one another on their patient’s outcomes 
rather than to their patient’s social risk factors, which providers have no direct control over. 
Researchers have argued that, in order for a more equitable practice among providers, social risk 
factors need to be more heavily monitored. Adjusting for these factors recognizes the greater 
challenges that are faced in achieving a better performance for beneficiaries like the dual eligible 
population, with greater social risk factors. This population has greater medical complexities and 
healthcare needs. Failing to adjust for these patient’s social factors can penalize providers for 
providing necessary additional services to their patients.  
In comparison, a common argument that researchers have suggested is that adjusting for 
these factors could lead to masking disparities in the quality of care provided. Although it is not 
certain, directly adjusting for these measures could forgive the delivery of subpar care to 
beneficiaries with social risk factors. Accounting for social risk factors that hold providers to 
different standards of care, could create the perception that patients with social risk factors are 
entitled to lower quality of care (Report to Congress,2017). In addition, neither an adjusted or 
unadjusted score provides information to the patient about which provider is better tailored to 
meet the patient’s needs. This limits the ability socially at-risk patients have to identify providers 
who will deliver the best care to them. Only stratification of social risk factors will reveal that 
insight to patients.   
As shown, there are both positive and negatives points to adjusting for social factors. 
However, under the current system social risk factors are not fully being addressed leading to 
unfair penalties among providers serving vulnerable patients. Social determinants of health are 
powerful predictors in determining an individual’s health outcomes. In order to better capture 
these social factors, they should be explicitly measured and stratified. Even if the concerns 
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mentioned above are not found to be true, without a change, perception of inequitable treatment 
can further increase distrust in the healthcare system among vulnerable populations. 
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5.0 Additional Policies to Reduce Disparities in Pay for Performance 
Additional policy considerations for beneficiaries with high social risk should involve a 
greater dedication towards health equity, understanding the population’s risk factors and patterns 
of care, and building collaborative partnerships within various care sectors. Through these 
considerations, there can be a greater effort towards pay for performance programs on reducing 
disparities while also ensuring the structure of the program does not exacerbate health by failing 
to account for patient’s social needs. Through improved methods, providers performance can be 
more accurately assessed and providers serving more vulnerable patients can be given adequate 
resources to take care of them.  
Promoting health equity can be attained by creating policies that hold providers 
accountable for achieving equity and rewarding providers that excel in that area. The creation of 
a health equity measure within the existing Medicare value-based purchasing program could 
incentivize providers to achieve a certain standard for beneficiaries with higher social risk factors 
(Report to Congress,2016). Applying a different payment threshold for rewards based on the 
reporting mix of social risk factors could achieve a better quality of care and equity. Weighting 
measures differently in the payment formula to adjust their importance to providers can achieve a 
different mindset for providers as well as adding a bonus for achieving low disparities. If 
measures were gauged off of baseline performances rather than compared to competitors, 
providers serving more socially disadvantaged groups could see an improvement in scores and 
reimbursement.  
In addition, adding a health equity quality measure could improve providers scores. 
Although measuring healthcare quality is a challenging endeavor, a quality metric should be 
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based on credible data because one hospital is not like another. Quality measures help providers 
prioritize areas, so if VBP programs can include a health equity quality measure provider would 
be more intent on reducing disparities. If a hospital is penalized for worse outcomes it should be 
because of poor care processes and not because of more vulnerable patients.  
Another potential way to minimize disparities includes Medicare rewarding practices for 
providing the best care to lower income patients at least as well as it rewards practices for 
providing the best care to higher income patients. This could help break the cycle of fewer 
resources for lower quality practices (Demeester,2017). In one study, researchers tested an 
alternative incentive payment approach with some of California’s largest managed care health 
plans. The approach used the incentive payments as a starting point, but then adjusted them 
based on the organizations weighted capitation rates and patient income. Under the program, the 
providers received a budget to take care of their patients rather than payments for separate 
services. The adjustment greatly reduced payment differences due to patients’ income, 
race/ethnicity, and region (James,2012). It also reduced medical spending and improved quality 
of patient care relative to providers paid through traditional fee for service approach.   
In addition, creating a payment formula that accounts for social and medical risk can 
improve vulnerable population’s health and potentially lessen inequality. When social risk 
measures are added, they can be used in addition to policies that explicitly target a reduction in 
disparities when evaluating provider performance. Since the social determinants of health 
account for 80% of health outcomes, providers should be given the support and resources to 
support patients with their social needs. In 2017, MassHealth’s social determinants of health 
payment model used existing Medicaid data to support care for vulnerable members and improve 
payment equity. A payment model was developed that added available social determinants of 
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health variables to medical diagnoses (Ash,2017). Using existing Medicaid claims and enrollee 
files, variables such as disability, mental illness, housing issues, and a neighborhood stress score 
were identified and assigned to patients.  
The payment model identified and allocated appropriate costs accounting for members 
medical, psychological, and social risks. For example, given a certain neighborhood stress score, 
providers who serve higher social risk patients were given more money per year to support the 
needs that address their patients’ social factors. Examples include using the additional money to 
help pay for a patient’s rent, connecting patients to community health workers, or buying a 
refrigerator for a patient’s insulin. The results showed that paying an additional $50 per patient to 
providers who serve in socioeconomically distressed neighborhoods, can support innovations 
that address their patients’ social complexities. When additional payments are recognized for 
individuals social and medical risk, it can address the root causes of poor health and high 
healthcare as well as improve health equity.  
These strategies have the potential to improve and account for all patient’s risk factors 
into VBP programs. Developing a health equity measure, measuring providers on their own 
baseline performances, and expanding the resources they have to serve their population can help 
achieve their goals in meeting the criteria for VBP programs. When pay for performance 
programs have stronger incentives and adequate risk adjustment, potential health disparities can 
be eliminated. In addition, tailoring interventions to personally meet providers needs will create a 
better care experience for the patient and a better reimbursement process for the provider.  
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6.0 Conclusion 
As similar to all healthcare systems, healthcare in the United States was organized to treat 
and care for sick individuals. However, because of the lack of investment in social services, the 
U.S. must recognize both social and medical risk factors in their healthcare system. This has 
created challenges to both patients and providers. Patients, specifically low-income individuals, 
lack the necessary support outside the hospital to live a healthy life, while providers are tasked 
with managing their patients’ complex conditions. This places an undue burden on physicians to 
remedy their patients’ problems while also securing they are providing high quality treatment.   
In order to achieve and hold providers to a higher quality of care, VBP programs were 
implemented. They intended to increase the quality of care delivered and to improve patients’ 
health outcomes. However, as shown by research, patients who have greater social risk factors 
are not fully accounted for in the current system and the providers who serve them are not 
supported with the necessary resources.  
MIPS and other VBP programs have the potential to enhance rather than threaten access 
to high quality care for beneficiaries with social risk factors. This can be done by creating 
complimentary policies to the current risk adjustment system that improve the current pay for 
performance structure to meet the needs of providers serving more vulnerable populations. When 
measures integrate social and medical risk providers can be more accurately assessed on the 
quality of care given to their patients. This leads to providing greater support and targeted 
rewards for better outcomes for socially at-risk beneficiaries. It is difficult to medicalize social 
services in the U.S. healthcare system. However, one step towards achieving this includes a 
balance between holistically capturing patient’s health care needs in pay for performance 
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programs and creating more tailored policies towards reducing disparities. When this can be 
done it can efficiently improve care delivery for vulnerable patients and lessen the disparities that 
exist in our current healthcare system.  
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